By Ayesha Siddiqa

The only discussion possible with the Taliban in Pakistan is on how best to strike a partnership in governing parts of the state or the state itself.

A COUPLE of weeks ago I had a chance to discuss the domestic situation on a local television channel in the company of a renowned intellectual. As in most talk shows, we participants were going around in circles trying to prove our respective points.

However, what I gathered from the debate was the need to define what we are up against. Is it an insurgency that we face or terrorism? Clarity on the issue is necessary.

The difference between how the state treats the ongoing conflict and the way society perceives it is a major problem in the country today. Interestingly, the state tends to use the American definition of calling the conflict an insurgency rather than terrorism. The Americans are justified in using this term because the resistance in Afghanistan and Iraq is partly geared towards evicting the US and other forces considered as invaders. In case Washington loses the war, it will not affect its overall power but only its power interests in this part of the world.

However, the conflict does not remain an insurgency when it enters Pakistan. Contrary to what Imran Khan would like people to believe, the war inside Pakistani territory is not about restoring the honour of the Pakhtun or evicting the invading forces, but about a specific group of people trying to change the nature of the state.

Many people tend not to notice the subtle difference between the two terminologies of insurgency and terrorism. Insurgency pertains to a militant movement by a group of people to attain certain political objectives that relate to the rights of a group of people in a specific territory.

So, the insurgent’s violence ultimately affects one part of the state.

More important, it is comparatively easier to divide the insurgents or negotiate with them since the ultimate objective is betterment of a group of people.

The Baloch movement is the only example of insurgency in Pakistan.

Terrorism, on the other hand, is the use of violence to pursue a larger agenda with the goal of taking over and changing the face of the entire state.

So, the only point at which a terrorist might negotiate is the offer of partnership in managing state affairs. Unfortunately, a lot of people in government and outside do not draw the distinction.

There are some who even argue that the state can actually negotiate with the terrorists. Such perception delinks ideology from violence and fails to evaluate the significance of the terrorists’ political agenda.

In this case, ideology is a multi-purpose tool. It is used to strengthen the movement. This is something that the terrorist cannot compromise on, else the whole focus of using violence against the state and society would be lost. In addition, ideology helps in winning the support of people beyond the core group and is non-negotiable. More importantly, this ideology is critical in changing the face of the state. Thus, it is more or less impossible to negotiate with terrorists.

For me, it was surprising to hear an intellectual talking about the possibility of negotiating with terrorists - the only discussion possible with the Taliban in Pakistan is on how best to strike a partnership in governing parts of the state or the state itself.

It is quite amazing that while Islamabad has shown great resistance to the Baloch insurgency, there is division in its ranks on how best to deal with the others operating in the rest of the country. The inability to bring development

to a disgruntled people in time has encouraged the separatist movement, which, if it succeeds, will only affect one part of the country i.e. Balochistan.

Meanwhile, state functionaries and significant groups in society have failed to build a consensus on how best to fight off Taliban terrorism for two reasons. First, there is the failure to properly define the conflict. Second, there is an inability to differentiate between the Taliban and the rest of the population due to common ideological threads.

Many tend to argue, all that the Taliban are asking for is more religion to bring improvement in governance. Perhaps, the only issue on which people tend to disagree with the Taliban is the extent of their violence. As long as the target is other nationalities and not the Pakistani forces or people, the Taliban could be tolerated because of the common ideological thread.

Therefore, there are those that relate to the Taliban mainly as a group which could bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. The Taliban, it is argued, only turned violent after the Americans struck after 9/11. This argument is extended to the Pakistani Taliban as well. However, it is dangerous to believe this because it tends to justify Taliban ideology without condoning their violence.

Those who stress the ‘fight against a foreign occupying force’ theory forget two things. First, the Afghan Taliban might be fighting the US but do not necessarily represent a force of resistance to foreign occupation.

After they fought the Soviet forces, the Mujahideen and Afghan warlords were deployed ambitiously on other fronts which gave them the appetite for extending their influence. Religious ideology came in later as necessary ideological clothing for the Taliban expansion. So, the Taliban fighting in Afghanistan and their partners in Pakistan are the ones who have a taste for expansion.

Second, invasion as a concept is not foreign to the region. It dates back to centuries. It includes the invasion of Mohammad bin Qasim who is said to have entered the region from the south and not the north. But what we are witnessing at the moment is an internal expansion which is aimed outwards on the basis of ideology.

So, the Taliban as a group are not just about resistance. They also represent a regional expansionist force which makes them different from other insurgents. Unless we begin explaining this to the people, instead of using terms borrowed from abroad, we might never be able to win the battle for hearts and mind that is necessary to make gains in the military conflict.

The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.

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(Source: DAWN)