Finally, the much-awaited Afghan strategy was unfurled by President Obama in a speech delivered at the United States Military Academy on 1st December 2009. In the backdrop of former President George Bush’s call to arms post 9/11, Obama’s wartime address sounded like an endgame rather than escalation of the US presence in Afghanistan.

As expected, a surge in American forces up to 30,000 was announced by him to augment the 68,000 troops already deployed in Afghanistan. The speech systematically progressed as the president recalled the factors that led to the present status of war in Afghanistan culminating with the recipes to chart a course for ultimate but honourable exit from Afghanistan.

Besides announcing a placement of additional troops, the salient feature of the speech has been the announcements of US intentions to withdraw from Afghanistan in three years’ time, a sustained ‘light’ presence of US troops’ as a sequel to the withdrawal in line with previous practices in Germany, Japan and Bosnia, reversal of Taliban gains, securing of population centres as they did during the last days of the commencement of withdrawal from Vietnam.

The other feature was declared focuses on training Afghans to enable them take over the security affairs, talks with the willing Taliban, putting pressure on the Karzai government to deliver and a request to Nato allies for more contributions towards the American efforts in Afghanistan. President Obama also talked about Pakistan wherein he categorically mentioned Pakistan’s centrality in his bid to normalise Afghanistan.

Most importantly, the president did not give an end date beyond July 2011; the pace of extracting US forces will depend on developments on the ground at that time. However, putting more troops carry an inherent risk of many more casualties on both sides of the border, including those that would be covered in the garb of collateral damage.

The speech left Pakistan with many apprehensions. Islamabad seeks to discuss the hidden implications of some elements of the speech. One thing is certain that with the induction of more troops and their deployment in the Pashtun dominated areas of Qandahar, Helmand etc. the Taliban would enter Pakistan and add to the instability factor of Pakistan’s tribal areas and Balochistan. The induction implies that given a timetable of 18 months, there will be strong military actions to achieve the aim in minimum possible time.

Would the build-up in Afghanistan breathe a new life into the flagging eight-year-old war or is it that Obama has just committed what could be the biggest political blunder of his years in the office that will decide the fate of elections process in the US, which would commence at approximately the same time as that commencement of withdrawal.

Why Pakistan is finding it difficult to be at home with the fresh US strategy? As said earlier, the sensitivities of what has not been said in the speech openly while deliberating on Pakistan, makes one ponder on the ultimate aim of this strategy. One issue that is sensitive is the issue of Indian activities in Afghanistan against the stability of Pakistan, for which ample evidence exists and that will be put across in the days to come. There are reports of undeclared efforts that are underway in the US to give some role to India in stabilising the Afghan security. However, the efforts to give some role other than reconstruction and bring it on the same table with Pakistan are quite worrisome.

The idea of placement of Indian troops in Afghanistan to fill the void when the Western forces leave Afghanistan and in the lead time slowly place them in the theatre would certainly be a perfect recipe for a regional disaster.

US Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen said the other day that Pakistan’s focus on the east with India has to be changed to get the best out of Pakistan. In doing so he just needs to understand the Indian mindset on Pakistan and get the US State Department rolling on making India come to negotiating table with Pakistan.

There have been irresponsible statements emanating from Indian corridors of power like General Deepak Kapoor commented that possibility of war existed with Pakistan. There have been other threatening overtures from Indian establishment.

What has rung alarm bells in Pakistan? There have been too many firsts to his credit as president of the United States with respect to Pakistan. For the very first time, he publicly linked Pakistan with Afghanistan as the epicenter of terrorism. He is the first president who mentioned five times “safe havens” across the border in Pakistan. He established a link of al-Qaeda with Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. He forgot that at every forum, his heavyweights in the administration and his generals have acknowledged many a time that the nuclear command and control in Pakistan is solid and cannot be undone.

In the backdrop of Obama’s speech, time has come for Pakistan when it must renegotiate its partnership with the US as a pledge has been made by the United States of forging a new and lasting relationship with Pakistan. The transit trade and share in US textile market are a couple of demands that Pakistan must place with them. On the new strategy, Pakistan needs to very carefully determine limits and red lines while negotiating the finer points in the same that may go against its interests. (By Bassam Javed)